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ABSTRACT
EARMARKED UTXO FOR ESCROW SERVICES AND TWO-FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
by Jisha Pillai
The security of accounts on the blockchain relies on securing private keys, but
they are often lost or compromised due to loopholes in key management strategies
or due to human error. With an increasing number of thefts in the last few years
due to compromised wallets, the security of digital currency has become a significant
concern, and no matter how sophisticated and secure mechanisms are put in place to
avoid the security risks, it is impossible to achieve a 100% human compliance.
This project introduces a novel concept of Earmarked Unspent Transaction
Outputs (EUTXOs). EUTXOs enable every user on the blockchain to lock their
funds to be spendable only to a designated set of users, even if the private key gets
compromised.
We validate the utility of EUTXOs by using it to implement an Escrow service in
the blockchain to overcome the limitations introduced by traditional Escrow services.
We also implement decentralized two-factor authentication (2FA) on the blockchain
using EUTXOs and discuss the tradeoffs of this design.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 What is a Blockchain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Proof-of-Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Cryptography on Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Transaction Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Blockchain Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Escrow service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 What is Escrow? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Escrow On Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Two-Factor Authentication with the Escrow service as a TTP 16
4.1 How Two-Factor Authentication Works? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2 Centralized Two-Factor Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 Earmarked UTXOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6 Restricted Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
v
vi
6.1 Restricted Escrow Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.2 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7 Blockchain As Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1 Enforced Escrow Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8 EUTXO Based Two-Factor Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.2 Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9 Current Approach vs Key management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Spartan Gold (SG) Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Communication Using An Escrow Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 Transaction from Alice to the Escrow service . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 Transaction from the Escrow service to Bob . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Two Factor Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7 2FA with Escrow Service on the blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8 A sample transaction published to blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9 Escrow To Bob Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10 Earmarked Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11 Earmarked Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
12 Initial UTXO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
13 Transaction From Alice To Escrow Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14 Transaction From Escrow Service To Alice’s Paper Wallet . . . . 26
15 UTXO After Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
16 Enforced Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
17 Initial UTXO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
18 Alice’s Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
19 Bob’s Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
20 UTXO After Alice To Bob Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
21 Decentralized 2FA Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
vii
viii
22 Earmarked Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
23 Transaction To Earmark SG Coins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
24 Alice To Alice’s Mobile Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
25 Alice’s Mobile To Bob Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
There has been tremendous growth in the cryptocurrency market in the past
decade. The primary reason behind the growth is its use of an ingenious technology
called the blockchain, which is used to manage the digital currency in a distributed,
decentralized, and immutable manner [7]. The blockchain maintains an incorruptible
public ledger that is available to every user in the blockchain network. As there
is no third-party or centralized authority involved in storing and maintaining the
data, there is no single point of failure. Thus, it is difficult for hackers to tamper
with or corrupt the data. The key features of the blockchain technology that led to
its success are the peer-to-peer (P2P) (Section 2.1.1) technology used to maintain a
shared distributed public ledger and the cryptographic techniques such as hashing
and public-key cryptography (Section 2.2).
Although the blockchain technology can ward off many attacks, its security
depends on users protecting their private keys. When the keys are lost, currency
may get stolen. 5.1 million dollars worth of bitcoins were stolen from BITSTAMP
on January 2015 [21], on August 2016 a 72 million dollars worth of bitcoins were
stolen from BITFINEX [2]. 7 million dollars worth of Ethereum was stolen from
COINDASH on July 2017 [23]. 16 million dollars worth of Ethereum and ERC20 were
stolen from a New Zealand based cryptocurrency exchange Cryptopia on January
2019, compromising around 17,000 wallets [6].
The major drawback of using public-key cryptography is the inability to store
and manage the cryptographic keys efficiently [3][4][5]. Inefficient key management
[11] leading to endpoint vulnerabilities (Section 2.5) is one of the primary reasons for
most of the attacks on the cryptocurrency exchanges. Endpoints are nodes on the
blockchain network where mining systems, PCs, or mobile phones reside. Nodes are
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the basic building blocks of the blockchain network, as they are responsible for storing
and managing wallets, initiating transactions, finding proofs, reaching consensus on
the validity of the transactions, etc. Ownership of an account in the blockchain
network is the same as owning the digital wallet. So if a wallet representing a node is
compromised, there is no way for the blockchain network to validate the authenticity
of the user [8]. Thus, nodes or endpoints are the most vulnerable points in the
blockchain network.
As we all know, "To Err Is Human" and no matter how sophisticated key
management strategies are put in place to avoid endpoint security risks, it is impossible
to avoid the loopholes that come with each strategy and to achieve a 100% human
compliance [11]. The goal of my project is to come up with security mechanisms that
will guard the cryptocurrencies against theft occurring due to compromising of wallets
and exchanges.
To achieve this goal, I introduce earmarked UTXOs (EUTXOs), with EUTXOs
funds can only be sent to a set of accounts specified at the time the EUTXO is created.
Specifically, the approaches implemented in this work are shown below. Steps 1
and 2 are implemented and used for comparison by the later approaches to discuss how
the limitations introduced by the first two approaches are overcome by approaches 3,
4, and 5.
1. Implement the Escrow service as a trusted-third-party on the blockchain and
discuss its limitations.
2. Implement two-factor authentication on the blockchain using the Escrow service
as a trusted third party and discuss its limitations.
3. Restricted Escrow introduces a novel concept of immutable earmarked UTXOs
(EUTXOs) field at the transaction level to earmark/lock the funds to be spendable
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to a list of recipients specified by the user. The approach combines the concepts
of Escrow service as a TTP and EUTXOs; here, the Escrow service’s possible
actions are restricted due to earmarked transactions.
4. Blockchain as Escrow with EUTXOs implements a decentralized Escrow service
where each user acts as its own Escrow on the blockchain.
5. Decentralized 2FA implements two-factor authentication on the blockchain
using EUTXOs.
A simplified blockchain based cryptocurrency called Spartan Gold (SG) [20]
developed by Dr. Thomas Austin is used as a foundation to implement and experiment
with different approaches incorporating EUTXOs. A simple Spartan Gold (SG)
transaction is shown in the Figure 1. The input field shows the address of the user
initiating the transaction and the output field contains the address of the receivers
and the amount of SG coins assigned to them. The transaction is signed with the
user’s private key and is included in the sig field; every transaction also consists of a
timestamp.
Figure 1: Spartan Gold (SG) Transaction
Spartan Gold implements the UTXOs at the block level, whenever a miner finds
the proof of a block and adds it to the blockchain, the UTXOs gets updated for
accounts involved in the transactions included in the block. Every user initiating the
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transaction should account for all the SG coins he/she owns, such that any leftover
change must be assigned back to the user initiating the transaction. Failing to assign
back the difference will result in the change being awarded to the miner who finds the
proof of the block containing the transaction.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 What is a Blockchain?
A blockchain [1] is a decentralized, distributed ledger available to everyone on
the blockchain network. Each block in the blockchain contains the data and the hash
of the previous block. The type of data in a block depends on the type of transactions
being carried out in the blockchain. The data field of a block in the blockchain that
does bitcoin transactions contains fields for the sender’s address and receiver’s address,
and the amount of bitcoins being transacted.
A hash of a block is used to uniquely identify a block. This feature of the
blockchain makes it difficult for attackers to tamper with the data in a block since
any modifications to the block results in the change of the hash value associated with
the block. Each block’s hash is computed using the hash of the previous block and
the data in the current block, thus forming a chain of blocks. So any modifications to
a single block in the blockchain will invalidate all the blocks that follow it. But with
the computational power available these days, an attacker could easily re-calculate
the hash of all the blocks that follow the block that was modified resulting in a valid
chain.
To overcome this drawback, the blockchain uses something known as Proof-of-
Work (PoW) discussed in Section 2.1.2. The advantage of PoW is that it delays the
time taken to create a new block.
2.1.1 Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
One of the most critical factors which make the blockchain secure and decen-
tralized is its use of a peer-to-peer (P2P) [1] network. Each peer is also known as a
node. In the blockchain technology, each node on the P2P network has a copy of
the distributed ledger. Since each node has a full copy of the blockchain, it becomes
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impossible to destroy or tamper with the data. If someone wants to tamper with the
data, they have to tamper with the replication of data stored on every node in the
blockchain network, thus making it impossible to achieve. This decentralized nature
of the blockchain overcomes the limitations of using a centralized authority for storing
and accessing data, which will result in a single point for failure or loss of data, as all
the data is stored and managed at a single location (e.g., Banks).
Nodes on the blockchain network act as clients who make transactions and accept
new blocks added to the blockchain; they also act as miners. Miners on the blockchain
are responsible for validating the transactions. They verify the signature and the
correctness of data for every transaction. Miners are responsible for consolidating a
set of transactions into a block. Each miner competes with other miners to find the
Proof-of-Work (PoW) (Section 2.1.2).
Once the miner finds the proof of a block, the peers on the network validate the
proof. The block which is agreed upon by more than 50 percent of the peers gets
added to the blockchain. After the block is added to the blockchain, the miner with
the proof of that block gets rewarded. For Bitcoin, a new block gets added to the
blockchain network every 10 minutes on average, and the miners are rewarded with
both transaction fees and newly minted bitcoins.
2.1.2 Proof-of-Work
Mining is carried out in Bitcoin using a Proof-of-Work (PoW) [9][15] system.
Miners compete with each other over the blockchain network to compute the proof
for a block. PoW is a complex mathematical problem that the miner has to solve
using a cryptographic hash algorithm. It is used to prove that a certain amount of
computation is performed before a block is added into the blockchain. It requires
the hash of each block to start with a certain number of 0’s. Since the process of
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generating the hash which meets the required criteria is a stochastic process, it requires
a lot of computation to calculate the hash, thus delaying the process of adding a block
to the blockchain.
In the case of Bitcoin, it requires 10 minutes on average to find a PoW for a new
block and add it to the blockchain. Even though a miner finds the PoW for a block,
the block is not necessarily accepted into the blockchain. The reason behind that is
that the blockchain is decentralized, so every user on the blockchain has their own
copy of the ledger available. When a miner finds the PoW for a block, it is published
into the network, and a copy of it is sent to all the users over the network. Once
the peers validate the proof of the block on the network and the block is added to
the blockchain, the miner who found the proof is rewarded with new bitcoins or with
the leftover change from the transaction in the form of a transaction fee. Currently,
12.5 bitcoins are generated per block. The number of bitcoins generated per block is
reduced by half for every 210,000 blocks generated [10].
2.2 Cryptography on Blockchain
The Blockchain uses hashing and digital signatures. Hashing is used by the
users on the blockchain network to reach an agreement on the current state of the
blockchain. Whereas, digital signatures are used to verify that the owners of the
transactions are who they claim to be.
2.2.1 Hashing
Hashing is a powerful technique used these days as fingerprints for files, documents,
and transactions. The hashes of the documents or transactions are computed to ensure
that the data is not tampered with in an unintended way. Hashing is the process of
taking input of any arbitrary length and converting it into an output of fixed length.
For example, the hashing algorithm Secure Hash Algorithm-256 (SHA-256) takes any
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length of data as input and converts it into a 256-bit output. This feature of hashing
algorithms makes it easier to verify and handle a large amount of data. The key
properties of the hashing [22] algorithm that makes it ideal for use in blockchain are:
• Deterministic: Hash of a particular input always results in the same output
• Efficient: Able to compute hash in a small amount of time irrespective of the
size of the input data.
• One-way: It is impossible to determine the input data from its hash value.
• A small change in input changes the hash value
Blockchain, as we discussed in Section 2.1, is a chain of blocks. Each block
consists of a set of transactions. Hashing is used as a mechanism to agree upon
the validity of the present state of the blockchain. The cryptographic hash is first
computed for the genesis block. For every block that follows afterward, the hash of
the previous block and the set of transactions in the current block is used to compute
the hash. With this property, changing of the input value of any block changes the
hash value of that block and all the blocks that follow it. Also, as the blockchain uses
a P2P network, each user on the network has a copy of the blockchain. Thus, making
it computationally infeasible to tamper with any of the transactions present on the
blockchain. Hashing acts as a backbone of the blockchain where the hash of the last
block acts as proof of the boundless state of the blockchain.
2.2.2 Digital Signature
Blockchain uses a digital signature based on public key cryptography to provide
authentication [9]. Each user in the P2P network has a key pair (public key, private
key) associated with it. The public key is published over the network when a
transaction is initiated by the user and acts as an identity of the user on the network.
The private key, as the name suggests, is stored privately in a digital wallet.
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Whenever a transaction is being published to the blockchain. The sender digitally
signs the transaction with his/her private key. The public key and the signature of
the sender is used by the users on the network to verify the authenticity of the user.
Figure 2 depicts how digital signatures work in the blockchain network.
Figure 2: Digital Signature
Figure 2 shows Alice sending a transaction to the blockchain network. She signs
the transaction using her private key and publishes the transaction into the network.
Bob who is also part of the network validates the authenticity of the transaction by
verifying the message with Alice’s public key. Since the blockchain implements a
peer-to-peer (P2P) network. The transaction needs to validated by every user on the
network as done by Bob.
2.3 Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs)
Unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) is the output of a transaction that has not
been spent. After every transaction, the input is deleted, and the output is updated
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to the UTXOs. Every user refers to the UTXOs available to him/her from previous
transactions to carry out future transactions. Analogous to the account balance in
Banks, UTXOs are the unspent crypto coins left for each public key/user on the
blockchain. However, unlike Banks which acts as a central authority in storing and
maintaining the balance, a copy of UTXOs of every public key on the blockchain
is available to every node on the network, thus, avoiding the single point of failure.
Each transaction on the blockchain can only use the unspent transaction output
(UTXO) from previous transactions. The reason for enforcing this mechanism in
cryptocurrencies is to avoid the problem of double-spending [16].
Double Spending can be defined as duplication of digital currency in order to spend
it multiple times. UTXOs keeps track of the unspent amount for each transaction. If
an attacker publishes multiple duplicate transactions simultaneously to the blockchain,
only one of the transactions will be accepted and added into the blockchain with the
help of proof-of-work, and the remaining transactions will be invalidated.
2.4 Transaction Fees
Transaction fees [18] are the crypto coins paid by the blockchain wallet in order
to add their transaction into the blockchain. Transactions are validated and added
into the block and eventually to the blockchain by miners through the process of
mining. Initially, when the transactions are published into the blockchain network,
they reside in a memory pool; from there miners pick up the transactions that they
wish to include in their block. The way the miners prioritize the transactions is based
on multiple factors such as transaction size and transaction fees.
For example, Bitcoin can add a block with a max size of 1 MB, so miners prioritize
transactions with a smaller size as they are easier to validate. Also, picking smaller
transactions enables them to include a large number of transactions into their block,
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hence obtaining a larger transaction fee. In order to include transactions of larger size,
the wallet has to pay a larger transaction fee.
Transaction fees are dynamically calculated by the wallet based on the current
state of the network, the size of the transaction, etc. However, it also provides an
option to customize our transaction fees.
2.5 Blockchain Risks
The most vulnerable area of the blockchain technology is actually outside the
blockchain network. It is the endpoints or the nodes where the risks start, as nodes act
as an interface for humans to access the blockchain network. Also, endpoints are used
for mining as well as for proofreading the transaction on the blockchain. The most
basic requirement for accessing a blockchain network is to have a key pair (public key,
private key). While the public key is published into the network and used as a means
to identify the user over the network, the private key needs to be stored privately in
a wallet and needs to be used by the user to sign his/her transactions.
The private keys are mostly stored in digital wallets at the endpoints/computers
in the network. If a hacker hacks into the computer and gains access to the wallet,
there is no way for the blockchain to validate the user. As each account on the
blockchain is identified by the key pair (private key, public key), whoever owns the
private key has complete ownership of the account. Blockchain has no means of
validating the change of ownership. One of the most important causes of the majority
of the blockchain attacks is inefficient security and management of wallet keys [11].
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CHAPTER 3
Escrow service
This chapter focusses on implementing a simple Escrow service on the blockchain
and pointing out the limitations introduced by this approach. The approaches
implemented in the later chapters overcomes the limitations introduced by this
approach.
3.1 What is Escrow?
An Escrow [14] service can be considered as a contract between the consumer and
the provider. A trusted third-party (TTP) serves as an Escrow service to ensure that
both the consumer and the provider fulfill the terms of their service. Suppose Alice
demands a particular service from Bob within a particular period of time, and Bob
charges a particular amount of money for the service. The Escrow service here acts
as a middle man between the two parties. Alice and Bob register with the Escrow
service. Alice transfers the service charge to the Escrow service along with the amount
of time within which the service needs to be completed.
Once Bob completes the service, he notifies the Escrow service as well as Alice.
The Escrow service then checks if the service was completed within a specified time;
if yes, the money is transferred to Bob.
Figure 3 shows the communication between Alice (the consumer) and Bob (the
provider) using an escrow service.
1. Alice transfers the service charge intended for Bob to the Escrow service.
2. (a) Bob notifies Alice regarding completion of the requested service.
(b) Bob also notifies the Escrow service regarding the completion of the re-
quested service.
3. Escrow service releases the funds sent by Alice to Bob.
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Figure 3: Communication Using An Escrow Service
3.2 Escrow On Blockchain
This approach implements the Escrow service as a trusted third party (TTP)
on the blockchain. The Escrow service is implemented as a user in the blockchain
network who listens for transactions involving an Escrow service on the blockchain
network. In order to identify a transaction involving an Escrow service, a comment
field is introduced at the transaction level. The comment field starts with the keyword
Escrow and contains additional information such as the address and the amount of
money that needs to be sent to the receiver along with the information regarding the
transaction fee for the Escrow service.
Let’s see how a transaction between Alice (consumer) and Bob (provider) takes
place with an Escrow service in the picture. Alice publishes a transaction addressing
the Escrow service as shown in the Figure 4.
Alice has 133 SG coins. Figure 8 shows that Alice publishes a transaction to the
Escrow service assigning 100 SG coins to the Escrow service and the remaining 33 SG
13
Figure 4: Transaction from Alice to the Escrow service
coins to herself. The comment field indicates that this transaction involves an Escrow
service and provides additional details to the Escrow service that it should send 99
SG coins to Bob and can keep 1 SG coin to itself as the transaction fee. Once the
escrow service receives the transaction published by Alice, it holds the funds until it
receives a notification from Bob (provider) regarding the completion of the requested
service by Alice. The Escrow service releases the fund once the requested service is
completed by Bob as shown in the Figure 5.
Figure 5: Transaction from the Escrow service to Bob
Figure 5 shows that the Escrow service sends 99 SG coins to Bob and assigns 1
SG coin to itself as the transaction fee.
Some of the implicit ideas incorporated while implementing the above approach
are:
• The Escrow service always charges a transaction fee of 1 SG coin per transaction.
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• The change that is not accounted for in the transaction is always assigned to
the miner who finds the proof the block containing the transaction.
• The unspent money in the transaction is always assigned back to the sender
who is initiating the transaction.
• The Escrow creates a new key-pair for each user it is transacting with and stores
it in its database to provide an additional level of security.
3.3 Limitations
The limitations of this approach are:
• The Escrow service is responsible for actively regulating the funds between Alice
and Bob. So, if the Escrow service defrauds from its service, there is no way to
ensure that the funds get transferred to Bob.
• The Escrow service could demand a higher transaction fees from Alice to transfer
funds to Bob.
15
CHAPTER 4
Two-Factor Authentication with the Escrow service as a TTP
This chapter extends the approach discussed in the previous chapter to implement
a centralized two-factor authentication (2FA) on the blockchain using Escrow service
as a trusted third party and discuss the flaws introduced by this approach. The
approaches implemented in the later chapters overcomes the limitations introduced
by this approach.
4.1 How Two-Factor Authentication Works?
Passwords were used as a primary method of authentication before two-factor
authentication (2FA) came into place. Passwords posed many security problems due
to the inability to store and manage them efficiently. Some of the commonly known
problems are the use of easily predictable, similar passwords for multiple accounts.
Storing passwords as plaintext on Databases, PCs or mobile, etc. Thus making
passwords susceptible to attacks such as Dictionary Attacks, Phishing, Shoulder
Surfing, Spidering, etc. 2FA [12][13] is used these days to overcome the drawbacks
with passwords. Two-factor authentication is used to provide an additional level of
security by combining two of the below three combinations:
• Something you know
• Something you have
• Something you are
Figure 6 represents a scenario which combines something you know (username/-
password) and something you have (phone). The 2FA depicted in Figure 6 can be
explained as:
1. The user tries to log in to an application using his/her username and password
(e.g., banking application).
16
Figure 6: Two Factor Authentication
2. The application sends a request to Trusted Third Party (TTP) 2FA provider to
generate a PIN.
3. A copy of the PIN is sent to the application.
4. A second copy of the PIN is sent to the user’s phone.
5. The user then enters the received PIN which is then validated by the application
in order to provide access.
Two-factor authentication can be carried out in various ways. Some of the most
commonly used ones are:
• SMS: The user receives a One Time Password (OTP) as a message after entering
the username and password into an application. The application authenticates
the user after entering the OTP. As explained in Figure 6.
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• Authenticator app: Uses a Time-based One Time Password (TOTP) [13] for
2FA. Where the app will generate an OTP or a QR code that needs to be
entered/scanned within the specified time window (e.g., Google Authenticator).
• Push-based 2FA: Notifies the user when a login attempt is made on his/her
account/device. The user can then accept/deny the request. Apple often uses
this approach with their devices.
4.2 Centralized Two-Factor Authentication
This approach focuses on implementing a centralized two-factor authentication
(2FA) service on the blockchain by implementing an Escrow service as a trusted third
party. The initial step is to implement the Escrow as a user in the blockchain, who
listens to the blockchain for any transaction that involves the escrow service.
A flow diagram representing how two-factor authentication (2FA) works on the
blockchain network with the Escrow service in the picture is shown in Figure 7.
The way the above communication works is, suppose Alice wants to send some
money to Bob. Alice decides to use the Escrow service for the transaction; she registers
herself with the Escrow service. She publishes her transaction to the mining network.
The transaction contains the amount of money that Alice wants to send to the Escrow
account, which should eventually go to Bob. Alice has included a comment field in her
transaction indicating that she is using the Escrow service and the amount of money
that she wishes to send to Bob along with information regarding the transaction fee
for the Escrow service as shown in Figure 8:
The above transaction shows that Alice is sending 100 spartan gold (SG) coins
to the Escrow and assigning the remaining coins that she is left with, i.e., 33 SG coins
to herself. The Escrow keeps listening to the mining network for any transaction
involving an Escrow service. If it finds one that Alice published, it sends a time-based
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Figure 7: 2FA with Escrow Service on the blockchain
Figure 8: A sample transaction published to blockchain
one-time password (TOTP) to Alice’s phone to make sure Alice indeed made the
transaction. She enters the TOTP.
Once the Escrow account verifies the PIN, it creates a transaction transferring
the funds to Bob and publishing it to the mining network as shown in the Figure 9.
The transaction published by the escrow account to the mining network is shown in
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the Figure 9:
Figure 9: Escrow To Bob Transaction
Figure 9 shows that Escrow transferred 99 SG coins to Bob and assigned 1 SG
coin to itself as the transaction fee.
A limitation that is still not overcome with the current approach is, even though
escrow can verify Alice’s identity after a transaction is made from Alice to Escrow.
However, if Alice’s credential (private key) gets stolen, there is no way of ensuring
the money get transferred to the Escrow service. In order to ensure that we need to
have a new mechanism of ensuring that the coins can be sent only to Escrow even if
Alice’s account is compromised. We will be discussing our approach for overcoming
this limitation in the following chapters.
20
CHAPTER 5
Earmarked UTXOs
We introduce a novel concept of earmarked UTXOs (EUTXOs). Earmark as
defined by Merriam-Webster is, to designate (something, such as funds) for a specific
user or owner. This feature enables the user/public key to lock his/her unspent
transaction outputs (UTXOs) to be spendable only to a designated set of users.
An additional field called earmarked is implemented at the transaction level
along with other fields such as input, output, timestamp, signature, and comment.
Using this feature the user will be able to spend his/her EUTXOs only to the list of
earmarked users.
Figure 22 represents a transaction involving an earmarked field. It shows a
special case of EUTXOs discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
Figure 10: Earmarked Transaction
Figure 22 shows that Alice’s computer which owns two key pairs is making a
transaction from one public key/address to the other. She is assigning the 400 SG
coins that she owns from her temporary key to the primary key, earmarking her
transaction to be spendable only to a designated set of public keys/users. Publishing
this transaction to the blockchain enables Alice to lock her UTXOs to be spendable
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only to the list of users specified in the earmarked field. The advantage with EUTXOs
is that, even if Alice’s key gets compromised, the only way to spend the 400 SG coins
is by sending it to the earmarked users. Thus, preventing the attackers from stealing
the SG coins.
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CHAPTER 6
Restricted Escrow
This approach implements the Escrow service as a trusted third party (TTP) on
the blockchain using EUTXOs to overcome the limitations introduced by traditional
Escrow service on the blockchain.
6.1 Restricted Escrow Approach
EUTXOs are introduced with the Escrow service on the blockchain to overcome
the drawbacks of traditional Escrow services as discussed in Chapter 3. The approach
discussed in this chapter is represented in the flow diagram Figure 11.
Suppose, Alice is the consumer and Bob is the provider. Alice has 400 SG coins
and the key pair KA. The service charge that Alice needs to pay Bob once the required
service is completed is 100 SG coins. Alice and Bob register themselves with the
Escrow service. Figure 11 depicts a scenario where Bob was unable to complete the
required service. The earmarked field introduced at the transaction level contains the
plausible recipients of the 100 SG coins, such as Bob, Alice’s paper wallet.
The scenario represented in the Figure 11 can be explained as:
1. Alice publishes 100 SG coins to the escrow service containing the service charge
that she needs to send Bob. Along with the comment field that contains the
address of Bob (needed by the Escrow service) and the earmarked field containing
the plausible recipients.
2. Escrow service receives the transaction.
3. Bob notifies the Escrow service that the requested service was not completed.
4. Escrow service scans through the Earmarked field for other plausible recipients
other than Bob. In this case, the Escrow service sends the 100 SG coins to
Alice’s Paper Wallet specified in the Earmarked field.
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Figure 11: Earmarked Escrow
5. Alice’s paper wallet receives the transaction.
Let’s discuss the above scenario from the implementation perspective. Highlighted
fields in the Figure 17 shows the initial UTXOs for Alice (133 SG coins), Bob (49 SG
coins), and Alice’s Paper Wallet (0 SG coins).
Alice (customer) needs to send 100 SG coins to Bob (provider) for the service.
Both Alice and Bob registers with the Escrow service. Alice creates a transaction
assigning 101 SG coins to the Escrow service and 32 SG coins to herself as shown in
the Figure 13. The pre-decided transaction fee for using the Escrow service in this
case is 1 SG coin. The earmarked field in the transaction shows that the money is
meant to be sent only to Bob or to Alice’s Paper Wallet.
If Bob (provider) notifies the Escrow service that the service was not completed.
The Escrow service transfers the funds to Alice’s paper wallet address present in the
24
Figure 12: Initial UTXO
Figure 13: Transaction From Alice To Escrow Service
earmarked field as shown in the Figure 14. The escrow service assigns 1 SG coin to
itself as the transaction fees and refunds 100 SG coins back to Alice’s Paper Wallet.
Figure 15 shows the updated UTXOs after the transactions. Alice’s current
UTXO is 32 SG coins, Bob has a UTXO of 49 SG coins as before, Alice’s Paper Wallet
has the refunded 100 SG coins as the current UTXO, and the Escrow service has a
UTXO of 1 SG coin (transaction fee).
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Figure 14: Transaction From Escrow Service To Alice’s Paper Wallet
Figure 15: UTXO After Transaction
6.2 Advantages
The advantages of the current approach are:
• Even though the Escrow service acts as a third-party/mediator of the transac-
tions, it does not have full control over the SG coins send to it. Every transaction
sent to it will involve an earmarked field, stating the SG coins can be spendable
only to the users in the earmarked field. Even though the Escrow service acts
as a TTP, its possible actions are restricted.
• If Alice’s private key gets compromised in the scenario depicted in Figure 11.
She could still obtain the refund from the Escrow service as it is sent to her
paper wallet.
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CHAPTER 7
Blockchain As Escrow
Decentralized Escrow service is implemented using EUTXOs. In this approach,
each user acts as their own Escrow.
7.1 Enforced Escrow Approach
This approach implements a decentralized version of the Escrow service on the
blockchain. Each user acts as their own Escrow service. Each user has the main
key and temporary key dynamically created each time a user wants to transact with
another user on the blockchain. Suppose, Alice (customer) wants to send 100 SG coins
to Bob (provider) for his service. Alice has a main key pair KA_Main, she generates
a new key pair KAB for the transaction from Alice to Bob. Alice publishes the
transaction of 100 SG coins to KAB. The transaction is earmarked to Bob and signed
with Alice’s main key KA_Main. Once Bob notifies Alice regarding the requested
service completion, she sends the private key KAB to Bob, who can now retrieve the
funds from the blockchain.Figure 16 shows the scenario discussed above.
Figure 16 provides a high-level flow diagram of the scenario discussed above and
can be explained as:
1. Alice published 100 SG coins to the temporary key KAB, earmarked for Bob.
The transaction is signed with her main key KA_Main.
2. Bob (provider) notifies Alice (customer) that the requested service is completed.
3. Alice sends the private key KAB to Bob.
4. Bob retrieves the funds published to the blockchain using the key KAB.
Let’s see how the transaction between Alice and Bob works at the implementation
level. Figure 17 shows the current UTXO of Alice is 133 SG coins and for Bob it’s 49
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Figure 16: Enforced Escrow
SG coins.
Figure 17: Initial UTXO
Alice needs to send 100 SG coins to Bob. So, she generates a temporary key and
publishes 100 SG coins to the newly created key and assigning the remaining balance
of 33 SG coins to herself as shown in the Figure 18. The earmarked field contains
Bob’s address, indicating that the 100 SG coins are only spendable to Bob. Once
Bob completes the service that he needs to provide Alice, he notifies Alice of the
completion of the service. Alice now sends the private key of the generated temporary
key pair.
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Figure 18: Alice’s Transaction
Bob can now retrieve the service charge using the temporary key. As Bob is also
the owner of the temporary private key, he publishes a transaction to the blockchain
to assign the 100 SG coins to his main key as shown in the Figure 19. Once the 100
SG coins are assigned to Bob’s account (main key), he can discard the temporary key.
Figure 19: Bob’s Transaction
The updated UTXO after Alice’s and Bob’s transaction as shown in the Figure 18
and Figure 19 is shown in the Figure 20. Alice’s current UTXO is 33 SG coins and
Bob’s current UTXO is 149 SG coins.
7.2 Advantages
The advantages of this approach are:
• Every user acts as their own Escrow. As there is no TTP involved in the
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Figure 20: UTXO After Alice To Bob Transactions
transaction. The customer has full control over locking and releasing the funds.
• Since the transaction published by the customer to the blockchain is earmarked
with the address of the provider. Customer cannot misuse the funds once it is
published to the blockchain.
7.3 Limitations
The limitations of this approach are:
• The provider could provide lesser service than the service promised, once the
customer publishes the transaction to the blockchain. As the fund published to
the blockchain is earmarked for the provider.
• The customer could publish lesser service charge than the amount promised to
the provider.
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CHAPTER 8
EUTXO Based Two-Factor Authentication
In this chapter, we will be discussing a novel approach to implementing a
decentralized 2FA for blockchain. This approach implements EUTXOs to achieve
decentralized 2FA on the blockchain. A simple flow diagram depicting the working of
this approach is shown in the Figure 21.
Figure 21: Decentralized 2FA Flow Diagram
In the flow diagram, Alice’s computer is a node in the blockchain network, with
10,000 SG coins. She has two keys, a one-time temporary key to lock her funds in the
blockchain and the main key to make all her future transactions. Alice locks/signs all
her funds with the temporary key and publishes it to the blockchain addressing Alice’s
main key. She creates an earmarked field as part of the transaction, earmarking
Alice’s mobile and paper wallet. The earmarked field is immutable and cannot be
changed once created. Once the transaction is in the blockchain, she discards the
31
temporary private key. Now, Alice’s main key owns the 10,000 SG coins, with an
exception that the funds are spendable only to Alice’s Paper wallet or her mobile. In,
this case, no matter how many transactions Alice’s computer makes in the future, it
should always only go to Alice’s mobile and/or her Paper Wallet. Alice’s computer
makes transactions to Alice’s Mobile as and when needed, specifying whom the coins
should go to in the comment field.
The approach discussed is represented in the flow diagram shown in the Figure 21
and can be explained as below:
1. Alice’s computer has the key pairs, KTemp, KM,PW . She publishes a transaction
to the blockchain assigning all her funds to KM,PW . The transaction contains
earmarked field with the address of Alice’s mobile and her paper wallet. The
transaction is signed with the key KTemp. The key KTemp is discarded after the
transaction is published to the blockchain, hence locking the earmarked funds
to be spendable only to Alice’s mobile and/or her paper wallet.
2. KM,PW receives the transaction.
3. KM,PW sends 100 SG coins to Alice’s mobile. Along with the transaction, there
is an earmarked field specifying that the transaction should only go to Bob or
Alice’s paper wallet. Also, there is a comment field specifying whom the money
should go to once Alice’s mobile receives it.
4. Alice’s mobile (KM) receives the transaction published to the blockchain.
5. Alice’s mobile confirms the transaction has been received. This communication
happens off-chain (not on the blockchain network)
6. Alice’s mobile now sends 100 SG coins to Bob.
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Figure 22 represents a transaction with the earmarked field.
Figure 22: Earmarked Transaction
Figure 22 represents a transaction, where the input field represents the address
of the sender. The output field contains the address of the receiver along with the
amount of SG coins that need to be transacted to the address. The timestamp field
is used to timestamp the transaction. The sig fields show the transactions digitally
signed by the sender with his/her private key. The comment field in the transaction is
used to convey any additional information that needs to be sent to the receiver. The
earmarked field is immutable once created and represents a list of public key/users
that the sender can transact with.
Decentralized 2FA is introduced in this approach by introducing earmarked field
(something you know) and multiple keys (something you know) for the user. Let’s
examine how an end to end transaction between Alice to Bob works. Alice has a
total of 400 SG coins. She needs to send 100 SG coins to Bob. Alice first publishes a
transaction to the blockchain assigning all her SG coins to her main key as shown
in Figure 23. The earmarked field in the transaction indicates that the SG coins are
spendable only to Alice’s mobile or her paper wallet. The transaction is signed with
the temporary key and discarded once the transaction is published into the blockchain.
Figure 24 shows a transaction from Alice’s computer to her mobile, where she
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Figure 23: Transaction To Earmark SG Coins
sends 100 SG coins to her mobile and assigns the remaining 300 SG coins to herself.
She earmarks the transaction to be sent to Bob or her paper wallet. The transaction
is signed with Alice’s main key. The input field shows Alice’s computer public
key/address and the output field shows that she is assigning 100 SG coins to her mobile
public key/address and the remaining 300 SG coins to herself. In our implementation,
the remaining change or UTXO is always assigned back to the sender. The change
that is not accounted for is assigned to the miner who finds the proof of the block
containing the transaction.
The transaction contains an earmarked field showing the list of users Alice’s
computer can transact with. In this case, two public keys (Bob and paper wallet). As
the earmarked field is immutable once created, she can spend her SG coins only to
the two earmarked public keys. The comment field specifies the address of Bob and
the amount of money that needs to be sent to him. Alice’s mobile uses these details
to create a transaction from Alice’s mobile to Bob as shown in Figure 25.
In the current approach, decentralized two-factor authentication. The two-factor
authentication is achieved using the two of the something you have features such as:
• Your phone
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Figure 24: Alice To Alice’s Mobile Transaction
Figure 25: Alice’s Mobile To Bob Transaction
• Your computer
8.1 Advantages
• If Trudy (the attacker) compromises Alice’s computer (private key), the only
way she could spend the SG coins is by either sending it to Alice’s mobile or her
paper wallet. As the earmarked field is immutable once it’s created.
• Alice’s mobile always receives only the exact amount of SG coins that need
to be transferred. If the Trudy (attacker) compromises Alice’s mobile (private
key), Trudy could only send the funds to either Bob or Alice’s paper wallet.
• In case, Alice’s mobile (private key) gets compromised. Alice’s computer could
send her money to the paper wallet address specified in the earmarked field.
35
8.2 Disadvantages
• If Trudy (the attacker) steals Alice’s main key and either her paper wallet or
mobile key, then Trudy could get away with Alice’s SG coins.
• As Trudy cannot spend the SG coins even if she compromises Alice’s computer
(private key), she could decide to do nothing with the money
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CHAPTER 9
Current Approach vs Key management
One of the major reasons for most of the cryptocurrency thefts [19] is inefficient
key management, leading to private keys getting compromised. Effective management,
control, and storage of private keys is a complex task with no clear solution to it
being found. There are several key management strategies that have been proposed in
several papers. The research in this area paced up after the Mt. Gox [17] incident in
the year 2014, where 370 million dollar’s worth of bitcoin was stolen by compromising
the private keys of their customers. Eskandari et al. [11] evaluates several key
management strategies, in order to explain how these complex strategies, lack the
true ability to achieve effective key management. A brief overview of the pros and
cons of some of the strategies are as described below:
Software wallets: Storing the private keys in a PC or mobile, inside a file/wallet
is one of the most common approaches used by Bitcoin. The major advantage
of this technique is user convenience, as the user doesn’t have to go through the
hassle of loading the private keys, digitally signing the transaction, etc. As it is
performed internally by the software itself. However, this approach comes with a set
of disadvantages as well. The keys stored locally on a device connected to the network
is susceptible to attack by Malware specifically designed to hack into the system and
compromise wallet keys, in order to gain access to the user’s digital currency. The
device containing the wallet keys could get stolen, depriving the user of his/her funds,
or the system may get corrupted or crash. Bitcoin users can also assign their UTXO
(unspent transaction output) to a new key every time a transaction is being made,
requiring an additional mechanism to store and manage newly created keys. Also,
users could have a key pool with a set of keys, where the change is assigned to a key
picked from the pool.
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Password-protected wallet: In this approach, bitcoin users can encrypt their
wallets with a key derived from the password of their choice. The approach wards
off keys getting stolen due to loss of the device. But, the attacker could still com-
promise the wallet keys digitally through malware, keystroke logging, etc. Also, if
the user forgets his/her password, the digital currencies associated with his wallet is
unrecoverable.
Offline key storage: In this approach, the bitcoin users can store their keys
offline on a Paper Wallet (e.g. QR Code) or on a USB drive. Keys are stored physically
with no access to the network, making it safe from malware attacks. However, every
time a transaction is made by the user, the private key should be read back into the
device, using a barcode scanner or by connecting the USB drive to the system. Thus,
making the keys again vulnerable to attacks.
Air-gapped device for key storage and signature: This is an extended form
of offline key storage, where the offline secondary device is used not only for storing the
private keys but also for creating and signing the transaction. Once the transaction is
being generated, it can be imported to the device connected to the network to publish
the transaction. An advantage of this approach is that the storage of keys and signing
of transaction takes place on a secondary device. Thus, not exposing the private keys
to the network. However, in order to import the transaction into the device connected
to the network, there needs to be a mechanism that connects the two devices. Thus,
making the secondary device susceptible to malware attack.
Hosted wallet: In this approach, a trusted-third-party (TTP) is used to manage
the user’s private keys/account. The TTP will host a set of web services exposing its
transactional functionalities, which can be available to the users using authentication
mechanisms such as a password or two-factor authentication (2FA). TTP uses the
transactional details provided by the user to create and sign the transaction with the
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user’s private key. With TTP there comes the risk of a single point of failure as it is
susceptible to attacks (analogous to banks).
We could conclude from our discussion above, that no matter how complex
strategies are in place for key management, There can always be a backdoor available
for the attacker to gain access to the private key. Moreover, it takes just a simple
human error to make these strategies vulnerable to attacks. Thus, instead of finding
a novel effective key management strategy, these approaches aim at formulating a
novel strategy that bypasses the loopholes of key management to some extent by
introducing the novel approach of earmarked UTXOs (Section 2.3).
The EUTXOs are immutable records published to the blockchain along with
transactions. These immutable records consist of a list of users that the owner of the
account can transact with. So, even if the private key of the user gets stolen, the only
way the attacker could spend the stolen digital currency is by sending it to any of the
addresses specified in the earmarked record for that user.
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CHAPTER 10
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we introduced a novel approach of Earmarked UTXOs (EUTXOs)
to ward off the cryptocurrency thefts occurring due to compromised private keys/wal-
lets. EUTXOs provided a mechanism for users on the blockchain to lock their UTXOs
to be spendable only to a designated set of accounts chosen by the user. The EUTXOs
introduced in this project is validated by using them to implement three different
services as shown below:
• Restricted Escrow with EUTXOs - Overcomes the limitations of traditional
Escrow service.
• Blockchain as Escrow with EUTXO’s - Decentralized Escrow service where each
user acts as their own Escrow.
• EUTXO Based 2FA - Implements decentralized 2FA on the blockchain using
EUTXOs.
The first approach implements EUTXOs with the Escrow service as a TTP on
the blockchain. This approach enables EUTXOs to restrict the amount of control the
TTP have on funds of its clients. Escrow services can only have limited control over
the funds between its clients as the transactions are always earmarked to be spendable
to a particular list of accounts. Thus, preventing Escrow service from defrauding from
its service, it also prevents the funds from getting stolen by compromising of TTP.
The second approach implements an Enforced Escrow, which can be considered as
a decentralized Escrow. In this approach, the sender generates a temporary key pair
for every new transaction and publishes the funds addressing the temporary public
key to the blockchain network, earmarking the transaction with the account of the
intended receiver. Once the transaction is published into the blockchain network,
the sender who initiated the transaction transfers the temporary private key to the
40
receiver in order to retrieve the transaction from the blockchain. This approach
enables every user on the blockchain network to act as its own Escrow as the sender
could release the key to the intended receiver only when the receiver completes the
requested service. Another advantage of this approach is that the sender cannot
compromise the funds intended for the receiver once it is published to the blockchain
as it is earmarked for the receiver.
The third approach implements a decentralized two-factor authentication (2FA)
on the blockchain with EUTXOs. It achieves 2FA with EUTXOs and multiple keys.
This approach allows the user to lock his/her entire funds by publishing a transaction
to the blockchain assigning all their funds to the public key of a newly generated key
pair, earmarking the transaction to be spendable only to the user’s mobile or user’s
paper wallet. The user only transfers the required amount of money that needs to be
sent to the receiver to the user’s mobile earmarking the transaction to be spendable
only to the receiver’s account.
One possible direction for this project in the future is to replace the Escrow
services used in one of the approaches with smart contracts by enforcing the conditions
introduced by the Escrow service into a set of rules pre-defined in the smart contracts.
The traceability and transparency of smart contracts make it a better approach
than the Escrow service. Also, the rules and conditions enforced by the EUTXOs in
the approaches can be encoded as part of smart contracts in an effort to make the
approaches more modularized.
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